Conventional implicatures are meanings encoded by particles like even, but, nevertheless, therefore, and so on. Take the sentence (1) below with even:
Here's the problem for the multi-proposition hypothesis. If H judges U's utterance reception correct, then U and H agree about an utterance. But if ID-even is correct, we are left with a puzzle about what the common proposition is that U and H agree about. On the multi-proposition view, assuming (5) captures the content of the even-sentence, U utters the even-sentence encoding the proposition that she, U has such and such probability state, and H, agrees, but on the basis that she, H, has a subjective probability state. U and H are talking at cross-purposes, since there are two distinct propositions concerning probability:
<U's credence state assigns low probability to O's being F> <H's credence state assigns low probability to O's being F> What's the proposition about subjective probability that they agree on, when one speaker agrees with the other that even Granny got drunk?
One might propose that the illusive secondary proposition about probability is the proposition that both speaker and hearer have a certain subjective probability state. But what about a third speaker, S, who overhears the conversation, though is not included in it? S can agree, or disagree with the even-sentence produced, but that won't be on the basis that S thinks both parties have the probability state. Rather, again, in line with ID-even above, S will search their own bosom, to determine whether they have the subjective-probability state.
Another proposal about the probability in secondary propositional content-<Granny is extremely unlikely to get drunk>-unlikelihood is irreducible. It's neither objective probability nor subjective probability, but somehow between these two poles. This is certainly a position one might propose. For example, consider:
(6) It's surprising that Granny got drunk.
It doesn't seem unreasonable to hold that utterance of (6) is neither a report about some objective fact of surprisingness nor a report about a mere subjective state. That certainly seems to be correct. But it's nevertheless problematic, since how can we invoke without explication such putative forms of probability or surprisingness? Moreover, it leaves us with a puzzle about the inter-subjective dimension (ID-even) as I have called it. 3 How does the fact that speakers consult their own subjective-probability states relate to judgements involving this supposed probability that is neither objective nor subjective?
Even if we could accept this kind of probability, I think the dual-proposition view still misrepresents implicature. The dual-propositional approach takes it as axiomatic that sentence content is propositional. So, although the implicature isn't part of the truthconditions of the sentence (1), it still has propositional content. So, on this view, in saying
(1), we say something true-that Granny got drunk-and something else true-that it's unlikely that she got drunk, even if this latter truth does not enter into the truth-conditions of the sentence in the way that the first proposition does. But I don't think that one is communicating a secondary truth with (1) Even Granny got drunk. For example, it's inappropriate to reply to utterance of (1) along these lines: What you are saying is true. It's surprising she got drunk. This misrepresents the mode of content delivery provided by implicature. But one could so respond to utterance of (4). In other words, (4) is not synonymous with (1).
Pragmatic Presupposition
Our attempts at reducing conventional implicature to semantic presupposition and to secondary propositional content have not worked. 4 What will work? One broad idea is that conventional implicature is pragmatic presupposition in Stalnaker's (1973) sense. On Stalnaker's view if a sentence S carries a pragmatic presupposition P then when S is uttered speakers would normally expect to hold P as common ground between discourse participants. We can allow that P is an attitude, for example, a subjective probability state. So U in uttering Even Granny got drunk would normally expect her discourse participants to have a subject-probability state assigning low likelihood to Granny getting drunk. Stalnaker's view, however, leaves a puzzle about how the pragmatic presupposition functions as a mode of content. Suppose U utters Even Granny got drunk. Then it seems part of the conventional meaning is that she normally expects that her audience have the probability attitude. But is this part of the truth-conditional content of the utterance? Clearly we don't want it to be. The speaker is not asserting that normally speakers have such and such attitudes. So what kind of speech-act is the speaker producing in communicating the content that the attitudes are background? Stalnaker's approach doesn't tell us. Rather it presupposes some as yet untheorized speech act. I conclude that Stalnaker's approach fails because it conflates the state (of a conversation) in which propositions are held as uncontroversial with a mode of delivery of content that is non-truth-conditional and presuppositional. It's the latter we are seeking to understand, and not the former if we want to illuminate conventional implicature.
Implicature and the Essence of Assertion
I now want to turn to the view of implicature which I think works. This view provides an account of non-said content delivery through an account of assertion that clearly distinguishes asserting from implicating. In what follows I treat implicating as a speech-act, of a non-assertoric kind-I will often call it an implicative act. If so, in uttering an implicature-bearing sentences, like (1), in a self-standing illocutionary act, a speaker U performs a compound illocutionary act, containing two speech acts that are intimately connected but distinct. U performs two acts, in tandem: (i) an assertion, and (ii) an implicative act. Utterance of the whole sentence is an assertion, but also an implicative act, both performed simultaneously. So utterance of (1) has a dual speech-act purpose. There is (1) insofar as its produced in the assertion-denote that by Even Granny got drunk ASS -and (1) insofar as it's produced in the implicative act-Even Granny got drunk IMP . If so, (1) can be judged true or false, because it's used to make an assertion, but also judged felicitous or infelicitous, because it's used to perform an implicative act.
The task now is to distinguish illocutionary act of assertion from the illocutionary act of implicating. You might think that the usual accounts of assertion will distinguish assertion from implicating. But they fail to do so. Typically, people distinguish assertion as a beliefmanifesting act, or one aimed at truth, or that act which is governed by the norm of knowledge. But such approaches will not distinguish assertion from implicating. So they cannot be correct accounts of assertion.
Take knowledge. According to the knowledge norm, assertion is that act, governed by the norm: assert that P only if you know that P. It seems that knowledge can apply to implicature-bearing sentences. Take:
(7) Buggsy knows that even the best philosophical minds can get confused.
In (7), implicature comes within the scope of knows-that-there is no reason to think it doesn't. If so, implicature-bearing sentences can be known. Moreover, a case can be made that one should only produce Even the best philosophical minds can get confused in a selfstanding act, if one knows that even the best philosophical minds can get confused. If so, a case can be made that implicature-bearing sentences conform to a norm of knowledge with respect to their production in illocutionary acts. But these acts are not assertions, so the knowledge-norm treatment of assertion cannot be right.
One might object that implicating cannot be governed by the norm of knowledge because implicatures are not propositional. Take an implicature-bearing sentence (1).
Nothing propositional is communicated by (1) regarding the implicature-at least that's what I have argued. One might contend then that this is why implicating is not asserting.
Assertions are displays of commitment to propositions, whereas implicative acts cannot be that, since there is no proposition to endorse. This is all very well, but it just assumes the distinction between propositional versus non-propositional speech acts. And what's the ground of that distinction? For example, take the truth-apt sentence (8):
(8) It's very unlikely that Granny got drunk.
(8) presumably encodes a proposition, whereas Even Granny got drunk IMP doesn't. If we are really going to explain the difference between the two sentences, we need to give an account of the nature of the proposition in the case of (8). But as we saw above in examining the Back's multi-proposition view of implicature-bearing sentences, that's hard to do.
One might reply that truth-aptness is the answer. The sentence (8) 
Brandom on Assertion
What of Brandom's celebrated theory of assertion (1996) ? Brandom attempts to carve out the assertions through the phenomenon of inference. For Brandom, assertion is a move in the game of giving and taking reasons, very roughly:
U asserts that S iff (i) U undertakes to justify S, if asked to, and (ii) permits speakers to use S as a premise in arguments.
However, Brandom's theory cannot deal with languages featuring implicature, since uttered implicature-bearing sentences meet both his conditions for assertions. Let's see how. 
Implicative acts meet condition (i).

Mental States Defended and Expressed
Let's note that on the present account sentences don't inherit their truth-aptness from the states that are defensively expressed through utterance of those sentences. Subjective probability states are not truth-apt. Still, the sentence (8) is truth-apt. Its truth-aptness comes from its being associated with an assertion, a speech act whose essence is linked to the defensive expression of states. 5
Although subjective probability states are not truth-apt they can nevertheless enter into relations of rationality. They can be grounded in evidence or sensory experience, and meet formal requirements. If so, one can have a defensive, reason-manifesting stance with respect to them. A general question at this point is whether this picture of truth-aptness and assertion generalises to all assertions. Should we analyse all assertion as acts of expressive defence with respect to mental states that are not in themselves truth-apt? This is the view that I have argued is indeed correct. Articulating and defending that goes beyond the bounds of this paper, and is not required as such to make the main claims presented here. 6
Both (1) and (8) can be believed. For example, one can believe that even Granny got drunk. So, we can say that utterance of (1) can be belief manifesting in that sense, and likewise with (8). So although these sentences involve expressing pre-doxastic states, nevertheless they are associated with beliefs. We shall look at the nature of belief states that makes sense of this idea below in §5.
Pure Expressivism
The account we have given of assertion is essentially expressivist. Take (8). (8) can be used to make assertions, but the state expressed is a non-doxastic state. This expressivism is nevertheless cognitivist, in that sentences like (8) are treated as truth-apt and belief manifesting, and not just in some minimalist way.
This pure expressivism allows us to make sense of the puzzle we had with receptioncorrectness and the intersubjective dimension, which we wrestled with in §1. Say H judges that U's production of an even-sentence is correct. What are U and H agreeing about according to ID-even? One answer is that they are agreeing about a speech-act type, one in which a speaker utters a sentence and defensively expressing some state Π and nondefensively expressing a distinct, but related, subjectively probability state Σ. In short, the bearer of agreement is not a proposition in the sense of a representation of a state of affairs, but a speech-act kind identified by mental properties. In other words, it's a compound illocutionary act type of the kind we have characterized above. In saying that the sentence is correct, H is expressing her disposition to perform the corresponding speech-act.
The only way to make sense of that is through an expressivist treatment of correctness-claims:
In uttering S is correct, U defensively expresses her disposition to produce S sincerely and clear-headedly.
In other words, statements of correctness defensively express dispositions to reissue utterances (judged to be correct). All of this goes to show that to make sense of conventional implicature we need some form of pure expressivism. Similar comments apply to the term true, as a predicate used in assessment of utterances. I leave details aside here.
reference, just what we might call conceptions of the good. But the price we pay for this is that expressing an attitude ceases to be a psychological matter. This does not mean that it's a mysterious emergent property either. Just as our expressivist treatment of the reference of good requires that we cease thinking of good's reference as a psychological property fixed by empirical attitudes of agents, given that F-attitudes move in tandem with the referent of good.
These proposals about reference attributions to good give rise to quite a few general philosophical questions. How does the expressivism about reference for good fit in with attributions of reference more generally? Is it part of a general expressivism about attribution of reference to predicates? I think it is-it's not attractive to suppose expressivism about reference merely applies to value predicates, though one might take this line. One might put forward a general case that in assigning reference to any predicate F, a speaker expresses a disposition to use F in a certain way. That certain way cannot be specified in terms that presuppose the reference of F. Rather, the certain way would have to be a use-property that involves capacities to interact with the environment, a differential sensitivity to entities in the world, but such facts of use would not amount to fixing reference. 8
To illustrate the thought, take colour-predicates. An expressivism about reference would have to suppose that a capacity to use red is underpinned by, say, mental modules that react differentially to surfaces in the visible environment. But we don't have to suppose that these mental modules enabling one to use red together, given embedding in an environment, fix an extension. Maybe the mental machinery of humans simply cannot fix something as precise as that. 9 Still, distinct speakers largely agree in the module structures that underlie their uses of red. That explains stability and agreement in practice, including indecision about borderline cases. But an expressivist about reference does not have to say this similarity in underlying functional states fixes an extension of the term as used by that group.
Nor do they have to say that it constitutes that fact that such and such speakers all mean the same by red. Rather, at best, the similarity of underlying functional states across certain groups of speakers explains why the meaning judgments of such speakers and their application of red to given surfaces tend to agree.
The expressivist about reference can still say that someone who sincerely claims that red as a word in a public language denotes yellowness betrays semantic confusion. We don't have to bring in conventions of language communities explicate the notion of semantic confusion or correctness. Rather the predicates, is semantically confused or is correctly using the term will themselves be predicates given expressive explication.
I don't think that the proposals about expressivism concerning refers in relation to value language necessarily require the sort of generalization I just sketched. Still, knowing that it's a possibility might support the specific local proposal about good, I have made.
Finally, the move we are making shows we need to be careful with the term express.
There is a sense of express that holds of Schmidt insofar as he produces utterances whose antecedents are certain attitudes, F-attitudes directed towards F S . But there is also a sense of actually being disposed to produce S. But that's not the only way. Another way is that I am told by someone that some utterance, which I may not have encountered, is correct. If so, we have to allow again, cognitive pathways, a state X that can be caused by a disposition to utter a sentence, but which might also be caused through a path of testimony, as when I am told that the first utterance made today is correct.
So how then do we deal with the amoralist? It should be clear, the amoralist is someone who acquires beliefs about the good, etc, through testimony-they have no other source for making such claims, since we are assuming lack of affect. However, that does not prevent their functional system's employing pathways of production that go through noncanonical routes. The amoralist is just like the person informed about subjective probability purely through testimony. Like Robbo's lack of real gambling behavior in relation to Timbo, the amoralist lacks motivation. Just as Robbo goes through the motions with placing bets, the amoralist might go through the motion of acting morally. But there is no real engagement. To conclude: IT is compatible with morally knowledgeable amoralists and motivational externalism.
Belief, Belief states, and Objects of Belief
We now come to the question of belief. It appears that there are beliefs about value, such that being nice to kids is a good thing. Moral utterances seem to express beliefs. Can the value expressivist accommodate this fact? Can the hybrid theorist accommodate it? Again, my strategy in this paper is to ask about implicature-bearing sentences and their relation to belief.
We can approach that question by asking if implicature-bearing sentences can appear in the scope of believe-that? They apparently can, as in:
(11) Timbo believes that even Granny got drunk.
(12) Schmidt believes that even Elvis was famous
The implicatures may or may not project from such a position. To project is to become a commitment of the whole utterance. 14 So for example, (11) could be a case of projection. In that case, the belief attribution carries an implicature about subjective probability. Even if there is projection, it does not follow that the content of the attributed belief does not include the implicature. The implicature can still be part of the content of the belief. This is clearer in the case of (12). In this case there is no projection. (12) 
